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I. Introduction 
While federal policymakers loudly combat the rapidly 
surging cost of higher education in the United States, consider a 
group of students who soundlessly remain outcasts: those who 
cannot establish their residency status in the United States. 
These students are ineligible recipients in the federal 
government’s massive higher education funding push—the 
federal student aid programs—and therefore remain bereft of a 
resource relied upon by nearly half of the nation’s undergraduate 
students.1 Undocumented students thus face a prohibitive 
                                                                                                     
 1. See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(5) (2012) (requiring a student be a U.S. citizen 
 
THE PROMISE OF PLYLER 2341 
complication to their education: operatively, the limitation 
concludes the education of many students once promisingly 
educated in the nation’s public primary and secondary schools.2  
In the past decade, states answered these concerns with 
legislation allowing such students to receive in-state tuition rates 
at public colleges and universities in the state regardless of 
residency status.3 A majority of states, however, do not have such 
laws, and the 2012 failure of the federal Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act,4 which aimed to 
alleviate the financial burden on undocumented students, levied 
additional urgency to resolve this limitation. With a nod to this 
pressure, public colleges and universities and state educational 
boards enacted institutional policies to provide in-state tuition to 
undocumented students without affirmative approval from the 
state legislature.5 
This Note examines federal impediments to institutional or 
state policy delivered without affirmative state legislation. This 
Note argues that Section 411 of the federal Personal 
                                                                                                     
or national to receive any funding under the federal student aid programs). In 
the most recent compilation of federal student aid data by the U.S. Department 
of Education, 47% of undergraduate students relied on the federal student aid 
programs to finance their education. Fast Facts: Financial Aid, NAT’L CENTER 
FOR EDUC. STAT. AT THE U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (2009), http://nces.ed. 
gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=31 (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See EDUCATORS FOR FAIR CONSIDERATION, THE CASE FOR UNDOCUMENTED 
STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (2010), http://e4fc.org/images/E4FC_The 
Case.pdf (noting that only 61% of undocumented students who arrive before age 
fourteen go to college, compared to 76% of permanent legal residents and 71% of 
residents born in the United States). Nearly 65,000 to 80,000 undocumented 
students graduate from U.S. public high schools every year. Id. In Plyler v. Doe, 
the Supreme Court prohibited states from refusing primary and secondary 
public education to undocumented students. See 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) 
(prohibiting the state from charging tuition to those who cannot prove legal 
residency).  
 3. See infra Part II.A (discussing current state law).  
 4. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th 
Cong. (2012) (attempting to implement previous versions of the DREAM Act, 
but failing in the Senate). The DREAM Act, in its various iterations, aimed to 
grant temporary legal status to certain immigrant students and eliminate 
penalties to allow states to determine residency for the purposes of in-state 
tuition. See id. (containing the most recent DREAM Act provisions).  
 5. See infra Part II.B (examining institutional policies).  
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Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA),6 in its own right, poses no bar to institutional policy 
of this nature because it plainly does not encompass reduced 
tuition in its prohibitions. In addition, this Note considers that 
potential violations of Section 411 are not justiciable in a federal 
suit from a private plaintiff because the provision carries no 
private right of action, faces prohibitive sovereign immunity and 
standing obstacles, and lacks momentum as a constitutional 
issue. Finally, this Note argues that Section 411 is feasibly 
justiciable in state court within, notably, a state consumer 
protection lawsuit brought by a state attorney general.  
Part II summarizes current state law, including states in 
which there is affirmative legislation providing in-state tuition 
rates to undocumented students and states in which there is 
affirmative legislation denying in-state tuition rates for such 
students.7 This Part looks closely at institutional policies in 
states in which the legislature has not spoken on the issue—
particularly Rhode Island, Michigan, and Colorado8—and 
explores how these policies operate and conform to existing law in 
other states.9  
Part III discusses federal statutory obstacles to institutional 
policy issued without affirmative state legislation. In particular, 
this Part studies Section 411 of PRWORA as the vital test to such 
institutional policy while recognizing the bearing of Section 505 
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)10 as a useful corollary to the institutional 
policy discussion provoked by Section 411.11 This Part considers 
                                                                                                     
 6. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 § 411, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1621 
(2012)). 
 7. See infra Part II.A (discussing the existing state law).  
 8. In August 2013, the Colorado legislature did pass a law granting in-
state tuition to undocumented students. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the 
Colorado law). The Colorado example, however, remains illustrative.  
 9. See infra Part II.A. (discussing the policies in Rhode Island, Colorado, 
and Michigan).  
 10. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
§ 505, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-672 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1623 
(2012)).  
 11. See infra Part III.A–B (examining Section 505 and Section 411).  
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that the incorporation of “postsecondary education” as a 
prohibited state or local public benefit under Section 411 was not 
meant to include reduced tuition, but instead was meant to 
encompass only state grants and scholarships.12 Including 
reduced tuition as a prohibited benefit is inconsistent with 
existing case law examining Section 411, congressional intent in 
enacting Section 411, and the Supreme Court’s assessment of 
public education in Plyler v. Doe13 and Grutter v. Bollinger.14 
Part IV observes that neither the federal government nor the 
federal courts will police potential violations of Section 411 
because there is no indication any federal agency has enforced 
the provision in the sixteen years since its enactment, the 
provision lacks a federal private right of action, and the provision 
harbors sovereign immunity and standing limitations in federal 
court. Further, this Part concludes that any constitutional claims 
are substantively weak.15 Part V argues that, despite these 
challenges in federal court, a state attorney general could force 
consideration of the federal statute through a state claim under 
state consumer protection law to protect the integrity of both 
public universities and state citizens.16 
II. In-State Tuition Law and Policy 
A. Current State Law 
Three states explicitly ban undocumented students from 
receiving in-state tuition rates at public colleges and universities: 
Arizona, Georgia, and Indiana.17 South Carolina prohibits 
                                                                                                     
 12. See infra Part III.B (discussing the interpretation of Section 411).  
 13. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 14. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
 15. See infra Part IV (discussing the justiciability limitations in federal 
court). 
 16. See infra Part V (examining the possibility of a state law claim 
exploring Section 411).  
 17. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1803(B) (2012) (“[A] person who was not 
a citizen or legal resident of the United States or who is without legal 
immigration status it not entitled to classification as an in-state student.”); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 20-3-66(d) (2012) (“Noncitizen students shall not be classified as in-
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undocumented students from enrolling in public institutions at 
all,18 and Alabama forbids undocumented students from enrolling 
in state two-year institutions.19 Fifteen states employ laws 
affirmatively granting eligibility for in-state tuition rates at 
public colleges and universities: California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and 
Washington.20 Many of the remaining state legislatures have 
considered bills modifying tuition-rate policy for undocumented 
students,21 but legislation of this nature is politically charged and 
                                                                                                     
state for tuition purposes unless the student is legally in this state and there is 
evidence to warrant consideration of in-state classification as determined by the 
board of regents.”); IND. CODE § 21-14-11-1(1) (2012) (“An individual who is not 
lawfully present in the United States is not eligible to pay the resident tuition 
rate that is determined by the state educational institution.”); see also Laura A. 
Hernandez, Dreams Deferred—Why In-State College Tuition Rates Are Not a 
Benefit Under the IIRIRA and How This Interpretation Violates the Spirit of 
Plyler, 21 CORNELL J. L. PUB. & POL’Y 525, 556–60 (2012) (surveying state laws 
denying in-state tuition benefits for undocumented students).  
 18. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-101-430 (2012) (“An alien unlawfully present 
in the United States is not eligible to attend a public institution of higher 
learning in this State.”).  
 19. See ALENE RUSSELL, AM. ASSOC. OF STATE COLLS. AND UNIVS., STATE 
POLICIES REGARDING UNDOCUMENTED COLLEGE STUDENTS: A NARRATIVE OF 
UNRESOLVED ISSUES, ONGOING DEBATE, AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2011), 
http://www.aascu.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=4524 (describing the 
Alabama prohibition on in-state tuition for the state’s public two-year colleges).  
 20. See Undocumented Students: State Action, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (July 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/undocument 
ed-student-tuition-state-action.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing 
states that currently have laws affirmatively granting in-state tuition to 
undocumented students) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In 
Oklahoma, the legislature amended its law to allow the Oklahoma Board of 
Regents to decide whether to grant in-state tuition to undocumented students; 
currently, the Board still allows it. Id. In 2013, Colorado, Minnesota, and 
Oregon joined the ranks of states with legislation affirmatively granting in-state 
tuition to undocumented students. Id.  
 21. See RUSSELL, supra note 19, at 2 (noting that, as of 2011, 32 states have 
considered or passed in-state tuition legislation). The number of state 
legislatures grappling with this issue unceasingly seesaws. In 2013, 23 state 
legislatures considered bills to improve access to higher education for 
undocumented students, including legislatures that previously struck down 
such legislation. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., STATE BILLS ON ACCESS TO 
EDUCATION FOR IMMIGRANTS 2013 1, 1–6 (2013).  
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therefore notably difficult to enact, often languishing in the 
hands of lawmakers.22  
Laws providing in-state tuition rates for undocumented 
students are also controversially received—public disagreement 
is nearly guaranteed, and legal challenge often awaits. For 
example, Maryland lawmakers passed a bill in 2011 allowing 
undocumented students to receive in-state tuition rates.23 
Governor Martin O’Malley’s ratifying signature incited a public 
petition condemning the law and sending it to a voter’s 
referendum for its reckoning; the law survived the popular vote 
in November 2012, after over a year of controversy.24 Similarly, 
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker revoked Wisconsin’s 2009 
legislative tuition break in his 2011 budget after significant 
public disagreement over the law’s enactment.25 In 2002, the 
Virginia attorney general issued an opinion forbidding public 
colleges and universities from enrolling undocumented students 
                                                                                                     
 22. See, e.g., Tim Hoover, Illegal Immigrant Tuition Break Fails Again in 
Colorado House, DENVER POST (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.denver 
post.com/breakingnews/ci_20481859/illegal-immigrant-tuition-break-fails-again-
colorado-house (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the repeated failure of the 
Colorado tuition bill) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The 
Colorado General Assembly made six attempts at a legislative in-state tuition 
break before passing the 2013 bill. Id; see also RUSSELL, supra note 19, at 4 
(describing legislative attempts to pass laws granting in-state tuition); NAT’L 
IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 21, at 1–8 (detailing the progress of 2013 
legislation aimed at tuition laws for undocumented students).  
 23. S.B. 167, 431st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011), 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2011rs/bills/sb/sb0167e.pdf; see also Ann E. 
Marimow, Gov. Martin O’Malley Signs Immigrant Tuition Bill Into Law in 
Maryland, WASH. POST (May 20, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/local/politics/gov-martin-omalley-signs-immigrant-tuition-bill-into-law-in-
maryland/2011/05/10/AFNNz8jG_story.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) 
(describing the enactment of Maryland S.B. 167) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 24. See Unofficial 2012 Presidential General Election Results for All State 
Questions, MD. ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS (Nov. 28, 2012, 8:56:01 PM), 
http://elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/results/general/gen_qresults_2012_4_00
_1.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (reporting the tuition measure as passed) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 25. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 20 (noting the 
Wisconsin revocation); see also STATE OF WIS. 2011–13 EXEC. BUDGET 12 (2011), 
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/debf/pdf_files/bib1113.pdf (describing Governor Scott 
Walker’s budget plan revoking the in-state tuition availability).  
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or granting in-state tuition to undocumented students.26 Thus, 
laws providing a reduced tuition rate to undocumented students 
are difficult to enact and difficult to sustain because of the 
divided political climate and public opposition they foster. 
Because of these barriers, a majority of states remain without 
legislation, and hundreds of universities remain without 
legislative guidance. 
B. Shifting Toward Institutional Policy 
The difficulty of formal legislative enactment affords an 
opening to accommodate undocumented students living in the 
state. In systems where a nonlegislative body has the power to 
make tuition classifications, that body can adjust the tuition rate 
for this category of students. Similar tuition classifications exist 
throughout public higher education. The most straightforward 
and common division is between in-state and out-of-state legal 
residents27—the legality of that classification is generally 
undisputed, and the Supreme Court legitimated the state’s 
interest in providing a reduced tuition rate to its bona fide 
                                                                                                     
 26. See Memorandum from Alison P. Landry, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Commonwealth of Va. Office of the Att’y Gen. on Immigration Law Compliance 
Update (Sept. 5, 2002), http://www.schev.edu/adminfaculty/immigrationmemo9-
5-02apl.pdf (stating the Virginia attorney general’s opinion that Virginia public 
colleges and universities should not enroll undocumented students). The U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia invalidated the state attorney 
general’s position in 2004. See Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 
585, 605 (E.D. Va. 2004) (finding the attorney general’s position that 
undocumented students may not be enrolled based on federal law invalid). After 
the state’s attorney general said enrollment alone violated IIRIRA and 
PRWORA, the court concluded that enrollment alone is not within the definition 
of “benefit” under either statute. Id.  
 27. See, e.g., Fees, Tuition, and Estimated Budget 2013-2014, UNIV. OF CAL. 
AT L.A. UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS (last updated May 15, 2013), 
http://www.admissions.ucla.edu/prospect/budget.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) 
(listing the different tuition rates for in-state residents and nonresidents) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Tuition, Fees, & Estimated Cost 
of Attendance, UNIV. OF VA. OFF. OF UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSION (last updated 
Oct. 12, 2013, 6:22 AM), http://www.admission.virginia.edu/admission/tuition 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (detailing the different cost of attendance for 
residents of Virginia and nonresidents) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
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residents.28 Universities, however, often make less publicized 
tuition classifications as well. For example, tuition reciprocity 
agreements allow some out-of-state residents to receive a reduced 
rate at public universities in neighboring states; this rate is 
generally available only to an out-of-state student whose home 
state is a party to the reciprocity agreement, foreclosing the 
reduced rate to other out-of-state students.29 These arrangements 
allow out-of-state residents to pay reduced rates at public 
institutions in neighboring states that are parties to the 
agreement; often, the reduced rate is 150% of the in-state rate.30 
In some states, this arrangement consists of a simple agreement 
with a neighbor state that allows students in each state to pay in-
                                                                                                     
 28. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 325–33 (1983) (“A bona fide 
residence requirement, appropriately defined and uniformly applied, furthers 
the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents 
are enjoyed only by residents.”). In Martinez, the Court clarified that the 
meaning of residence can vary, but a policy may certainly consider both 
“physical presence and intention to remain” without violating the Equal 
Protection Clause. See id. at 327–30 (finding tuition policy favoring residents 
constitutional).  
 29. See, e.g., Western Undergraduate Exchange, W. INTERSTATE COMM’N FOR 
HIGHER EDUC., http://www.wiche.edu/wue (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) 
(explaining the tuition reciprocity system) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). There are four major tuition-reciprocity systems in the United 
States: the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, Western 
Undergraduate Exchange (WICHE–WUE), the Southern Regional Education 
Board Academic Common Market (SREB), the New England Board of Higher 
Education Tuition Break program (NEBHE), and the Midwestern Higher 
Education Compact (MHEC). Id.; Academic Common Market, S. REGIONAL 
EDUC. BOARD, http://www.sreb.org/page/1304/academic_common_market.html 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (explaining the SREB system) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Regional Student Program Tuition Break, 
NEW ENG. BOARD OF HIGHER EDUC., http://www.nebhe.org/programs-
overview/rsp-tuition-break/overview/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the 
NEBHE tuition break program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Midwest Student Exchange Program, MIDWESTERN HIGHER EDUC. 
COMPACT, http://msep.mhec.org/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the 
MHEC tuition break program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 30. See, e.g., Western Undergraduate Exchange, W. INTERSTATE COMMISSION 
FOR HIGHER EDUC., http://www.wiche.edu/wue (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) 
(“Students who are residents of WICHE states are eligible to request a reduced 
tuition rate of 150% of resident tuition at participating two- and four-year 
college programs outside of their home state.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
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state tuition rates at public universities of the other state.31 
Similarly, many public universities charge a different rate for 
different programs of study at the university.32 The law abides 
these classifications and universities regularly utilize them.  
Given these accepted categories, the existence of a tuition 
classification alone is not enough to render a tuition classification 
for undocumented students unlawful. Accordingly, institutions 
have begun offering reduced tuition rates for undocumented 
students.33 Institutional policy tends to mirror the terms 
stipulated in existing state laws, which are reasonably consistent: 
the student must (1) have attended a state high school for three 
years or graduated from a state high school;34 (2) be registered 
with or currently enrolled in a state college or university; and 
                                                                                                     
 31. See, e.g., Tuition Reciprocity, MINN. OFF. OF HIGHER EDUC., 
http://www.ohe.state.mn.us/mPg.cfm?pageID=813&1534-
D83A_1933715A=1d7188c51 3e76f1f094bf8d1b85694f136c2f9e1 (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2013) (explaining that Minnesota has reciprocity agreements with 
Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota, one institution in Iowa, and the 
Canadian province of Manitoba) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 32. See, e.g., Tuition Costs, Fall/Spring 2013–2014, UNIV. OF TEX. AT 
AUSTIN, http://www.utexas.edu/tuition/costs.html (last visited Nov. 10,, 2013) 
(showing different tuition rates depending on undergraduate program of study) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); CU-Boulder Full-Time 
Tuition and Fees by School/College and Year, UNIV. OF COLO. AT BOULDER OFF. 
OF PLAN., BUDGET, & ANALYSIS (last updated Aug. 26, 2012), 
http://www.colorado.edu/pba/budget/tuitionfees/tuitfee.HTML (last visited Nov. 
10, 2013) (listing variable tuition rates by program of study and residency) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 33. See, e.g., Understanding Metropolitan State University of Denver’s 
Colorado High School/GED Non-resident Tuition Rate, OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, 
METRO. STATE UNIV. OF DENVER, http://www.msudenver.edu/president/chsged/ 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013) [hereinafter MSU Nonresident Rate Memorandum] 
(explaining the university’s new in-state tuition policy for undocumented 
students) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); S.B. 12-015, 68th 
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2012), http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS/ 
CLICS2012A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/3DA9CD12AA62452F87257981007E06CA?Open
&file=015_01.pdf (including the language of the failed ASSET bill). 
 34. In some variations, the law requires that the student also lived in the 
state with a parent or guardian while attending that high school. See, e.g., TEX. 
EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 54.052(a)(3), 54.053(3) (2012) (classifying as a resident a 
person who graduated from a public or private high school in Texas or received 
the equivalent of a high school diploma, and maintained a residence 
continuously in Texas for three years preceding the date of graduation). 
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(3) sign an affidavit certifying he is currently seeking legal 
residency status or will do so as soon as he is eligible.35 These 
laws have withstood some legal challenge in state courts,36 and, 
though questioned and controversial, their terms have proceeded 
legally unscathed for the last decade. In this framework, three 
notable efforts to reduce tuition for undocumented students in the 
absence of state legislation affirmatively reducing that tuition 
merit further mention.37 
                                                                                                     
 35. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2001) (listing the 
requirements for in-state tuition for a student who cannot prove legal residency 
in California); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6301(5) (2002) (defining “resident” for tuition 
classification purposes). A student qualifies for in-state tuition under California 
law if he or she (1) attended a California high school for three or more years; 
(2) graduated from a California high school or received the equivalent GED; 
(3) is registered or currently enrolled in a California community college, a 
California state university, or a University of California institution; and 
(4) signed a statement with the college or university stating he or she will apply 
for legal residency as soon as he is eligible. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5. In New 
York, the resident definition includes a student who (1) attended a New York 
high school for two or more years, graduated, and applied to attend a City 
University of New York (CUNY) institution within five years or (2) attended a 
New York state program for the GED exam preparation and applied to attend a 
CUNY institution within five years; and (3) filed an affidavit stating the student 
has applied or will apply for legal residence. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6301(5). See also 
ALEJANDRA RINCON, THE COLLEGE BD., REPOSITORY OF RESOURCES FOR 
UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS 2–39 (2012), 
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/Repository-Resources-
Undocumented-Students_2012.pdf (summarizing legal requirements in each 
state granting in-state tuition to undocumented students). 
 36. See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 864 
(Cal. 2010) (upholding California’s in-state tuition for undocumented students 
law).  
 37. Arizona and Massachusetts are also struggling with this controversy; 
however, both tie reduced-tuition eligibility to eligibility under the federal 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) law, which defers deportation 
enforcement for individuals who meet certain criteria, and allows them to 
receive work permits. In November 2012, Massachusetts Governor Deval 
Patrick directed the Massachusetts Department of Higher Education to offer the 
in-state rate to undocumented students eligible for work permits in 
Massachusetts. See Kevin Robillard, Report: Mass. to Offer In-State Tuition to 
Illegal Immigrants, POLITICO (last updated Nov. 19, 2012, 12:10 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/84040.html (last visited Nov. 10, 
2013) (announcing the Massachusetts policy) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). Because these laws implicate federal law for the eligibility 
determination and therefore raise different legal questions, this Note will focus 
on examples that do not employ that implication.  
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1. Rhode Island Board of Governors 
The Rhode Island Board of Governors for Higher Education 
(the Board) is the regulatory agency responsible for running the 
three public institutions in Rhode Island: the Community College 
of Rhode Island, Rhode Island College, and the University of 
Rhode Island.38 The Rhode Island General Assembly failed to 
pass its 2010 bill proposing to exempt undocumented students 
from paying nonresident tuition.39 In its wake, the Board voted to 
adopt an amendment to its residency policy, which sets tuition 
rates at the public institutions in Rhode Island. The amendment 
allows certain undocumented students to receive the in-state 
tuition rate at its public universities, effective Fall 2012.40 The 
policy amendment defines “resident” to require that:  
The student has attended an approved Rhode Island high 
school for three (3) or more years and continues to live in 
Rhode Island; and [t]he student has graduated from an 
approved Rhode Island high school or received a high school 
equivalency diploma from the state of Rhode Island; and [i]f 
the student is not a U.S. citizen and/or does not have lawful 
immigration status, he or she has filed an affidavit with the 
institution stating that the student has filed an application for 
lawful immigration status, or will file such an application as 
soon as he or she is eligible to do so. The failure of a student to 
file an application for lawful immigration status as soon as he 
or she is eligible will result in a forfeiture of in-state tuition 
rates in the future.41 
The requirements mirror both the language of state law in other 
states and the failed Rhode Island bill.42 Despite public criticism, 
                                                                                                     
 38. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-59-4 (2006) (describing the responsibilities of 
the Board).  
 39. H.B. 7172, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2010).  
 40. See R.I. BD. OF GOVERNORS FOR HIGHER EDUC., MEETING MINUTES OF 
SEPT. 26, 2011, at 5–7 (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.ribghe.org/pdfs/2b050712.pdf 
(voting to adopt the new residency policy granting in-state tuition to 
undocumented students in Rhode Island); R.I. BD. OF GOVERNORS FOR HIGHER 
EDUC., RESIDENCY POLICY (EFFECTIVE FALL 2012) 1–2 [hereinafter R.I. RESIDENCY 
POLICY], http://www.ribghe.org/residency1for2012.pdf (allowing an undocumented 
student to receive in-state tuition and fees upon satisfying certain requirements). 
 41. R.I. RESIDENCY POLICY, supra note 40, at 1–2. 
 42. See H.B. 7172, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2010) (listing the 
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there has been no legal challenge to the Rhode Island policy to 
date, and the policy is currently in effect.43 
2. Michigan: The University of Michigan 
In 2013, the University of Michigan became the most recent 
institution to offer in-state tuition to undocumented students without 
the affirmative signature of the state legislature. Like Rhode Island, 
the Board of Regents for the University of Michigan passed a 
measure allowing in-state tuition for undocumented students who 
(1) attended high school in Michigan for at least 3 years, (2) attended 
middle school in Michigan for 2 years prior to high school, and 
(3) matriculated at the University of Michigan within 28 months of 
graduating from a Michigan high school.44 Michigan has no state law 
affirmatively providing these benefits, and the measure only affects 
tuition at the University of Michigan; other state schools still charge 
the out-of-state rate to undocumented students.45 
3. Colorado: Metropolitan State University of Denver 
Prior to the 2013 Colorado legislation affirmatively providing in-
state tuition to undocumented students, Metropolitan State 
University of Denver (MSU) implemented an institutional 
policy  roviding in-state tuition. Its policy, however, remains 
                                                                                                     
proposed requirements for an undocumented student seeking in-state tuition); 
supra Part II.A (describing the requirements from existing state law).  
 43. See Tina Susman, Rhode Island Gives In-State Tuition to Illegal 
Immigrant Students, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2011, at 9, available at 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2011/09/rhode-island-approves-in-state-
tuition-for-children-of-.html (explaining public controversy over the Rhode Island 
policy).  
 44. UNIV. OF MICH. REGENTS, GUIDELINES FOR IN-STATE TUITION 7 (2013), 
http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/pa/key/documents/INSTATETUITIONGUIDELINE
S.pdf. 
 45. See Aaron Guggenheim, Regents Pass Measure to Provide In-State 
Tuition for Undocumented Immigrants and Veterans, MICH. DAILY (July 18, 
2013), http://www.michigandaily.com/news/regents-pass-measures-provide-state 
-tuition-undocumented-immigrants-and-veterans (last visited Dec. 11, 2013) 
(discussing the recently enacted University of Michigan policy) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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illustrative of a controversial institutional policy that explicitly 
eliminates direct state subsidies that would typically be included 
in an in-state tuition rate. MSU is a public university in Colorado 
serving nearly 23,000 students.46 When the Colorado legislature 
failed to pass its in-state tuition for undocumented students bill47 
for the sixth time, the MSU Board of Trustees voted to adopt an 
institutional policy providing a discounted tuition rate to 
students who live in Colorado but cannot prove lawful presence, 
effective August 2012.48 Without this policy, such students would 
be permitted to enroll, but would be treated as out-of-state 
residents paying the full out-of-state tuition rate. The policy, 
however, allows the students to pay less than the full out-of-state 
tuition rate, though they still pay more than a resident of 
Colorado who is classified as in-state based on proof of lawful 
presence.49 In other words, undocumented students are not 
paying the same rate as either an in-state resident or an out-of-
state resident—they fall within a separate classification 
altogether. A legal Colorado resident attending MSU pays $4,304 
per academic year (two semesters); an out-of-state student 
attending MSU pays $15,985.20 per academic year.50 An 
undocumented student taking advantage of the nonresident 
tuition policy pays $7,157.04 per academic year.51  
The variation in the rates results from overt exclusion of all 
direct per-student state stipends from the rate for undocumented 
students.52 The state typically subsidizes part of the in-state rate 
                                                                                                     
 46. See About MSU Denver, METRO. ST. UNIV. OF DENVER, 
http://www.msudenver.edu/about/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the 
structure of Metropolitan State University Denver) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 47. See S.B. 12-015, 68th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2012), 
http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS/CLICS2012A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/3DA9CD12AA62
452F87257981007E06CA?Open&file=015_01.pdf (outlining Colorado’s most 
recent failed tuition bill, ASSET). 
 48. See MSU Nonresident Rate Memorandum, supra note 33 (allowing 
students who cannot prove legal residence in Colorado but attended high school 
in the state to receive in-state tuition).  
 49. See id. (explaining the tuition classifications at MSU). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. See Memorandum from Stephen M. Jordan, President, Metro. State 
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through these stipends, resulting in a charge reduction to bona 
fide residents. Thus, MSU’s undocumented student-rate 
calculation begins with the $4,304 charged to in-state residents, 
then adds back and charges the student the exact amount of state 
stipends, including $1,860, $342.04, and $650.60, totaling 
$7,157.04.53  
Like the Rhode Island policy, MSU’s requirements for 
undocumented students seeking to utilize this residency 
classification follow the pattern set by existing state law and the 
failed Colorado bill. The student must have (1) attended a 
Colorado high school for at least three years; (2) graduated from a 
Colorado high school or completed a GED in Colorado; and 
(3) submitted an affidavit that certifies he is in good legal 
standing and is seeking or intends to seek lawful status when he 
is eligible.54 
                                                                                                     
Univ. of Denver, to Members of the Joint Budget Comm. (June 19, 2012), 
http://www.msudenver.edu/media/content/presidentofficeof/6-20-12%20JBC%20 
Memo.pdf [hereinafter Joint Budget Comm. Memorandum] (describing MSU’s 
deliberate exclusion of state stipends from the calculation). Colorado public 
universities are unique in receiving three direct per-student stipends from the 
state for each resident to whom they grant in-state tuition—the College 
Opportunity Fund (COF), the Fee-for-Service (FFS) subsidy, and the capital 
contribution allocation. See Memorandum from Dianne E. Ray, CPA, State 
Auditor, to Members of the Legislative Audit Comm. 4 (Oct. 12, 2011), 
http://www.leg.state.co.us/OSA/coauditor1.nsf/All/A0A7A668C004B5118725793A0
079854C/$FILE/HE%20ENTERPRISE%20MEMO%20-%20102111.pdf (describing 
the state stipends in Colorado). COF is a state-funded voucher for in-state 
students attending state universities of which students must authorize 
disbursement on their behalf, currently at a rate of $62.00 per credit hour. See 
College Opportunity Fund (COF) Stipend, COLO. DEP’T OF HIGHER EDUC., 
http://highered.colorado.gov/Finance/COF/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) 
(describing the COF system in Colorado) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). The purpose of this voucher system is to eliminate a tuition cap 
imposed by the Colorado Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR) by allowing a public 
university to be classified as an enterprise and thus gain exemption from 
TABOR. See Ray, supra, at 6 (describing the benefits of enterprise status). 
Finally, the school also receives the FFS and capital contribution in the amounts 
of $342.04, and $650.60, respectively. Joint Budget Comm. Memorandum, 
supra, at 4. 
 53. See Joint Budget Comm. Memorandum, supra note 52, at 4 (detailing 
the deliberate exclusion of state stipends from the nonresident rate calculation).  
 54. See MSU Nonresident Rate Memorandum, supra note 33 (describing 
the requirements imposed under MSU’s nonresident policy).  
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At the request of the Colorado Community Colleges, Colorado 
Attorney General John W. Suthers reviewed MSU’s policy. In 
June 2012, that office issued an opinion stating MSU’s policy 
violates federal law and risks federal funds to the state.55 The 
opinion reasoned that discounted tuition is a “public benefit” 
within the meaning of Section 411 of PRWORA, and that MSU 
therefore may not provide it without legislative approval.56 The 
institution moved forward with the policy despite the negative 
opinion and enrolled students under the new rate beginning in 
August 2012.57  
III. Federal Statutory Obstacles to Institutional Policy  
Because Congress has plenary power over immigration 
issues, institutional policies affecting undocumented students 
implicate federal law.58 Two federal statutes bear on this issue: 
Section 505 of IIRIRA,59 and Section 411 of PRWORA.60 While 
Section 505 is peripherally implicated, institutional policies raise 
particular concerns under Section 411.61 
                                                                                                     
 55. See Op. Colo. Att’y Gen. No. 12-04 AG Alpha No. HE CO AGBDU (June 
19, 2012) (finding the university’s policy in violation of Section 411 of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act). 
 56. See id. (discussing reduced tuition as a public benefit); see also infra 
Part III.B.1 (discussing the interpretation of “state or local public benefit” under 
Section 411).  
 57. See Anthony Cotton, Metro State Tuition Plan Gives Some Hope, Leaves 
Others Fuming, DENVER POST (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.denverpost. 
com/news/ci_21387731/metro-state-tuition-rate-plan-gives-some-hope (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2013) (describing reactions to Metro State University’s new tuition plan 
for undocumented students) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 58. See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate 
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”), superseded by 
statute, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 
Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2012)).  
 59. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
§ 505, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-672 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1623).  
 60. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 § 411, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1621). 
 61. See infra Part III.B (describing the challenges to institutional policy 
raised by PRWORA).  
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A. IIRIRA Section 505 
Section 505 of IIRIRA provides that an alien not lawfully 
present in the United States shall not:  
[B]e eligible on the basis of residence within a State (or a 
political subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit 
unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible for 
such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope) 
without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a 
resident.62 
This provision presents two challenges to law or policy granting 
in-state tuition to an undocumented student.  
First, Section 505 raises the possibility of a federal 
preemption challenge to any state law or policy granting a tuition 
rate to an undocumented student on the basis of residency.63 In 
2010, however, the California Supreme Court ruled that 
attendance at a high school in the state is “not the functional 
equivalent of residency,”64 and therefore dismissed the 
preemption challenge because the law simply did not award a 
benefit on the basis of residency.65 No other legal challenge under 
Section 505 gained momentum on the merits, and states still 
generally follow the California model.66 In fact, the Colorado 
attorney general explicitly declined to consider Section 505 when 
evaluating MSU’s tuition policy, noting that the California 
Supreme Court upheld the approach.67 Thus, awarding in-state 
                                                                                                     
 62. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a).  
 63. See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 864 
(Cal. 2010) (challenging state law granting in-state tuition as preempted by 
Section 505).  
 64. Id.  
 65. See id. at 861 (noting the statute’s “criteria are not the same as 
residence, nor are they a de facto or surrogate residency requirement”).  
 66. See supra Part II.B (describing the structure of in-state tuition laws). 
Other claims for violations of Section 505 have been dismissed for lack of 
standing. See, e.g., Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1135 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(dismissing on justiciability grounds). 
 67. See Op. Colo. Att’y Gen. No. 12-04 AG Alpha No. HE CO AGBDU (June 
19, 2012) (“Metro State’s proposal . . . seeks to avoid IIRIRA’s specific 
prohibition by administering the tuition discount [based] . . . upon three years’ 
attendance and graduation from high school here. This approach was upheld in 
California, and it is not necessary to question it in this Opinion.”(footnotes 
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tuition on the basis of attending high school in the state 
continues to proceed unharmed, though no federal court has 
spoken on the issue.  
Second, Section 505 raises questions about the interpretation 
of the term “postsecondary education benefit.” The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), responsible for administering Section 
505,68 clarified that enrollment in a public institution of higher 
education alone is not a benefit encompassed by Section 505.69 As 
such, enrolling undocumented students does not violate these 
provisions, but DHS has issued no further clarifications. The 
legislative history surrounding Section 505 is similarly 
inconclusive. A conference report for an unenacted predecessor 
bill to Section 505 indicates that “postsecondary education 
benefit,” as defined in that bill, was meant to include in-state 
tuition.70 Martinez v. Regents of the University of California71 
concluded, however, that while the committee report for this 
unenacted bill could reasonably apply to Section 505 because it 
included the same language, it did not reliably show Congress 
                                                                                                     
omitted)). 
 68. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012) (conferring enforcement of “this chapter 
and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens” on 
the Secretary of Homeland Security).  
 69. See Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Office of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement to Jim Hackenberg, Raleigh News and Observer (May 9, 
2008) (explaining that it is the school’s decision whether to enroll undocumented 
students); Letter from Sheriff Jim Pendergraph, Exec. Dir., Office of State and 
Local Coordination, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas J. Ziko, Special 
Deputy Att’y Gen., N.C. Dep’t of Justice (July 9, 2008) (stating DHS’s position 
that admission to a public university is not one of the benefits regulated by 
Section 505 and Section 411). This position is consistent with case law finding 
enrollment alone is not a benefit as defined in IIRIRA or PRWORA. See Equal 
Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 605 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“Simply put, 
access to public higher education is not a benefit governed by PRWORA.”).  
 70. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 240 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“This section 
provides that illegal aliens are not eligible for in-state tuition rates at public 
institutions of higher education.”). IIRIRA was proposed as its own bill (H.R. 
2202 in the 104th Congress), but ultimately implemented as part of the 
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009. The conference report accompanying the enacted bill does not 
elaborate on the meaning of this provision. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-863 (1997) 
(Conf. Rep.). 
 71. 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010). 
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intended to prohibit states from allowing unlawful aliens to pay 
nonresident tuition.72 The report, the court reasoned, imposed a 
strict prohibition and therefore simplified actual statutory 
language that was “not absolute, but qualified,”73 and therefore 
the statutory language itself prevailed.74 Thus, enrollment alone 
is not a benefit under Section 505, but law and policy sidestep the 
remaining interpretive issues surrounding “postsecondary 
education benefit” altogether by tying in-state tuition rates to 
attendance at a high school in the state rather than residency in 
that state. Handled as such, the reduced rate is no longer a 
residency-based benefit, thereby removing it from the scope of 
Section 505 without regard for the reach of “postsecondary 
education benefit.” 
B. PRWORA Section 411 
Section 411 of PRWORA provides that an alien who does not 
fall within any exception “is not eligible for any state or local 
public benefit.”75 The thrust of this provision is to exclude any 
undocumented individual from receiving any assistance that falls 
within the meaning of “state or local public benefit.”76 Section 
                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 865. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. (“Some legislators might have supported section 1623’s plain 
language qualifying the prohibition but not have supported the committee 
report’s seemingly absolute language. Section 1623’s actual language prevails, 
not the committee report’s.”).  
 75. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2012). Classes of individuals excepted from these 
provisions are (1) qualified aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1641, which includes lawfully 
present aliens; (2) nonimmigrant aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1101, which includes 
ambassadors and diplomats; and (3) aliens paroled into the United States under 
8 U.S.C. § 1182.  
 76. In another provision employing language similar to Section 411, 
PRWORA also precludes such an alien from receiving federal public benefits. 
See id. § 1611 (“[A]n alien who is not a qualified alien . . . is not eligible for any 
Federal public benefit.”). Tuition rates are classified by the state, so the federal 
public benefit definition is not directly applicable. See id. § 1611(c) (“Federal 
public benefit means . . . any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or 
assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment 
benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are 
provided . . . by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the 
 
2358 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2339 (2013) 
411(c) defines “state or local public benefit” to include “any grant, 
contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license 
provided by an agency of a State or local government or by 
appropriated funds of a State or local government,”77 and “any 
retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, 
postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment 
benefit,”78 or “any other similar benefit for which payments or 
assistance are provided . . . by an agency of a State or local 
government or by appropriated funds of a State or local 
government.”79 
Section 411 also permits the state to affirmatively legislate to 
allow eligibility for the otherwise prohibited benefits listed in the 
section.80 Because of this exception, the remaining provisions of 
Section 411 do not bind any state that passes a law permitting an 
undocumented student to receive in-state tuition. Thus, the “state 
or local public benefit” definition is not implicated in discussions 
of the fifteen states that have laws affirmatively permitting in-
state tuition to undocumented students.81 
The definition is relevant, however, to institutional policies 
in states in which there is no affirmative legislation. In other 
words, if a reduced tuition rate is considered a “public benefit” 
within this definition, an institution enacting its own policy 
granting such a rate to an undocumented student would be in 
violation of federal law. If a reduced tuition rate is outside the 
definition of “public benefit,” an institution could offer that rate 
on its own and maintain compliance with Section 411. 
                                                                                                     
United States.”). 
 77. Id. § 1621(c)(1)(A).  
 78. Id. § 1621(c)(1)(B).  
 79. Id. PRWORA excepts from this definition assistance for health care 
items needed for emergency medical treatment; short-term emergency disaster 
relief; public health assistance for immunizations and related testing for 
symptoms of communicable diseases; and certain programs specified by the 
Attorney General that deliver in-kind services, do not condition the provision of 
assistance or the amount of assistance or the cost of assistance on the 
individual’s income or resources, and are necessary for the protection of life or 
safety. Id. § 1621(b).  
 80. Id. § 1621(d).  
 81. See supra Part II.A (exploring current state law).  
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1. The Text of Section 411 Indicates Reduced Tuition Is Not a 
“State or Local Public Benefit”  
Though Section 411 includes the term “postsecondary 
education” in its list of forbidden benefits,82 the scope of the term 
is unclear.83 Contextually, the term harbors two possible 
interpretations: first, it could be understood broadly to include 
any and all possible assistance flowing from a postsecondary 
education institution, or, second, it could be understood to include 
only certain categories of assistance. For instance, a 
postsecondary education benefit could include enrollment in a 
public institution, reduced tuition at a public institution, state 
grant aid toward a public institution, or any combination of these. 
Both courts and the executive branch, however, carved out 
enrollment in a public institution from the meaning of 
“postsecondary education benefit” by excluding it under Section 
505 and Section 411,84 suggesting that courts and the executive 
branch consider various aspects of postsecondary education to be 
severable, distinct units, some of which may fall within the 
statutory definition and some of which may not. As such, 
postsecondary education benefits under Section 411 could 
reasonably apply only to a subset of—and not to all—
postsecondary education-related remunerations.  
                                                                                                     
 82. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(B) (2012).  
 83. Very little case law exists on this provision. See infra Part III.B.2 
(discussing the case law examining Section 411).  
 84. See Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 605 (E.D. Va. 
2004) (“Simply put, access to public higher education is not a benefit governed 
by PRWORA.”); McPherson v. McCabe, No. 5:04-CT-990-FL, 2007 WL 4246582, 
at *4 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 10, 2007) (finding decisions on enrolling undocumented 
students in higher education within the school’s discretion because it is not a 
benefit within the federal statute and therefore not preempted by federal law); 
Sanchez v. Hall, No. 5:10-CT-3027-D, 2011 WL 6369821, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 
19, 2011) (following McPherson and allowing the institution to decide whether to 
enroll undocumented students); U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Office of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, supra note 69 (explaining it is the 
school’s decision whether to enroll undocumented students); Pendergraph, supra 
note 69 (explaining admission to a public university is not a benefit 
encompassed by IIRIRA); see also supra Part III.A (discussing interpretation of 
Section 505). 
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Section 411 specifies that any benefit similar to those 
listed—including retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or 
assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, and 
unemployment benefits85—would also be prohibited under this 
provision. Critically, however, receiving the full benefit of reduced 
tuition differs from the other listed items in that it requires a 
significant financial contribution from the recipient to fulfill it. 
For example, at MSU in Colorado, an undocumented student 
receiving this “benefit” would still pay nearly $29,000 out-of-
pocket for a four-year degree and receive no direct monetary 
contribution from the state.86 An individual recipient of 
retirement, welfare, health, disability, or public or assisted 
housing may pay no out-of-pocket monetary amount at all in the 
same period, but that individual may receive significant and 
direct monetary contributions from the state. 
This distinction suggests reduced tuition is a different type of 
benefit; in fact, the postsecondary education benefit most similar 
to the listed benefits is state grant aid.87 In the academic year 
prior to the enactment of Section 411, states awarded $2.9 billion 
in grant aid from state funds to postsecondary education 
students.88 This number excludes loan amounts that must be 
                                                                                                     
 85. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(B) (2012).  
 86. See MSU Nonresident Rate Memorandum, supra note 33 (detailing 
that the rate for the special category of nonresidents is $7,157.04 per academic 
year); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing MSU’s policy).  
 87. For an example of an available state grant program, see Helping 
Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) Program, GA. STUDENT FIN. 
COMMISSION, http://www.gsfc.org/gsfcnew/HopeProgramm.CFM?sec=3 (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the financial assistance available under the 
HOPE scholarship program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 88. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE STUDENT GRANT & AID PROGRAMS (NASSGAP), 
TABLE 1: TOTAL GRANT AID AWARDED BY STATE GRANT PROGRAMS, 1995–96, 
27TH ANNUAL SURVEY ON STATE-SPONSORED STUDENT FINANCIAL AID, available 
at http://www.nassgap.org/viewrepository.aspx?categoryID=3. This figure 
includes both need-based and merit-based aid. Id. The amount of state grant 
aid disbursed has steadily increased over the past forty years, in part due to 
the introduction of the federal Leveraging Educational Assistance 
Partnership (LEAP) program, which appropriates federal funds to assist 
states in providing grant aid. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070c(a) (2012) (describing the 
incentives authorized by LEAP); John J. Cheslock & Rodney P. Hughes, 
Differences Across States in Higher Education Finance Policy 4–5 (Ctr. for the 
Study of Higher Educ., Pa. State Univ., Working Paper No. 5, 2011), 
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repaid to the state; it is exclusively grant aid for which the 
student must repay nothing. For the 2010–2011 academic year, 
this figure was $9.2 billion.89 State grant aid, then, is a 
significant state expenditure requiring no monetary 
contribution from the student; this differs greatly from reduced 
tuition, for which the state provides no direct monetary 
contribution and the significant expenditure comes from the 
student.  
These state grant funds come directly from state coffers. In 
Georgia, for example, the Helping Outstanding Pupils 
Educationally (HOPE) grant program is funded entirely by 
revenue from the Georgia lottery.90 In contrast, any expenditure 
toward reduced tuition is indirect, coming from a blend of 
private and state funds that run the institution.91 For instance, 
in 2011, four-year public institutions of higher education saw, on 
average, over 40% of their educational operating revenue come 
from privately paid tuition, with the remainder derived from 
state support and other sources.92 Reduced tuition, then, is not 
directly paid by the state as state grants are; rather, loss 
resulting from reduced tuition is an amalgam of private funding 
and indirect state support that is not clearly allocable to state 
funds because operation of the institution is not fully state-
supported.  
In other words, the difference between state grant aid and 
reduced tuition is dollar-for-dollar actual loss. Though an 
undocumented student pays less at an in-state rate than he 
would pay at an out-of-state rate, analogy of the amount lost by 
                                                                                                     
available at http://www.ed.psu.edu/educ/cshe/working-papers/WP%235 
(describing increases in state grant aid over the past few decades).  
 89. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE STUDENT GRANT & AID PROGRAMS, TABLE 1: TOTAL 
GRANT AID AWARDED BY STATE GRANT PROGRAMS, 2010–11, 42ND ANNUAL SURVEY 
ON STATE-SPONSORED STUDENT FINANCIAL AID, available at http://www. 
nassgap.org/viewrepository.aspx?categoryID=3. 
 90. See GA. STUDENT FIN. COMMISSION, supra note 87 (describing the HOPE 
scholarship program as fully funded by revenue from the Georgia state lottery).  
 91. See STATE HIGHER EDUC. EXEC. OFFICERS (SHEEO), STATE HIGHER 
EDUCATION FINANCE, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 22 (2012), http://www.sheeo. 
org/sites/default/files/publications/SHEF_FY11.pdf (examining the sources of 
revenue at public institutions of higher education).  
 92. Id. at 21.  
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reducing tuition to the amount lost by paying a state grant 
award leans on the assumption that an undocumented student 
would still attend that school if required to pay out-of-state 
tuition, and that assumption is doubtful.93  
Once paid, then, the cost deducted from state funds for a 
state grant is fixed, but the price tag on reduced tuition is less 
clear. The state would not necessarily lose the difference between 
out-of-state tuition and reduced tuition because there is no 
guarantee that the student would attend the state university if 
charged the full out-of-state rate, and there is no guarantee the 
money toward the reduction came from state funds. Congress’s 
purpose in including “postsecondary education” as a prohibited 
benefit under Section 411, then, could reasonably be to protect 
the sizeable, certain expenditure of state grants and scholarships, 
and not reduced tuition. 
2. Case Law Evaluating Section 411 Supports This Interpretation 
Very few courts have studied the meaning of Section 411. 
Martinez v. Regents of the University of California94 raised 
questions about the specific interpretation of “state or local public 
benefit” as it relates to in-state tuition classifications within 
Section 411, but the court did not decide the issue because the 
California law at issue fell within the Section 411 exception 
allowing the state to affirmatively legislate to provide any 
benefit.95 Again, courts agree that enrollment alone is not a 
benefit encompassed by Section 411.96 The few other courts to 
                                                                                                     
 93. See LATINO POLICY INST., THE EFFECTS OF IN-STATE TUITION FOR NON-
CITIZENS: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 10 (2011), 
http://rwu.edu/sites/default/files/lpi-report.pdf (noting that there is a 31% 
increase in noncitizen enrollment in states where in-state tuition is offered to 
undocumented students). In addition, noncitizens are statutorily ineligible for 
all federal student aid programs administered by the U.S. Department of 
Education, limiting the most popular and accessible avenues to fund higher 
education. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(5) (2012) (requiring a student be a U.S. citizen or 
national to receive any funding under the Title IV programs).  
 94. 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010). 
 95. See id. at 867–68 (concluding that the state had legislated to 
affirmatively provide the benefit, thus bringing the case within Section 411(d)).  
 96. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing enrollment falling 
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interpret Section 411 recognize a difference between direct, need-
based state expenditures and assistance to which the individual 
is contributing, though these cases deal with specific issues in 
individual states that do not directly answer the in-state tuition 
question.97 In Department of Health v. Rodriguez ex rel. 
Melendez,98 the Florida District Court of Appeals found the Brain 
and Spinal Cord Injury program, which is wholly funded by the 
state,99 to be within the definition of “state or local public benefit” 
and, therefore, unavailable to illegal immigrants without 
affirmative state legislation.100 Similarly, a New York state court 
found funds from the state food stamp program unquestionably a 
public benefit under Section 411.101 
                                                                                                     
outside the public benefit definition).  
 97. Most courts to consider questions surrounding Section 411 do not 
decide the meaning of “state or local public benefit.” See, e.g., Martinez, 241 P.3d 
at 867–68 (concluding that the state had legislated to affirmatively provide the 
benefit, thus bringing the case within the exception in Section 411(d) and 
rendering the other provisions of Section 411 irrelevant); Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 
670 F.3d 1096, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (denying the plaintiff’s request for a 
preliminary injunction because the plaintiff either lacked standing or would not 
succeed on the merits, rather than deciding the interpretation of Section 411); 
Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Tex., 675 F.3d 802, 816 
(5th Cir. 2012) (deciding the ordinance in question aimed only at targeting the 
presence of illegal aliens and therefore infringed on the federal authority over 
immigration and the conduct of foreign affairs, rather than deciding the 
statutory interpretation question); Garcia v. Dicterow, No. G039824, 2008 WL 
5050358, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2008) (dismissing the § 1621 complaint on 
agency grounds without deciding whether the benefit in question fell within the 
statutory definition). 
 98. 5 So.3d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).  
 99. See Brain and Spinal Cord Injury Program, FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
http://www.floridahealth.gov/diseases-and-conditions/brain-and-spinal-cord-
injuries/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the Brain and Spinal 
Cord Injury Program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The 
program is funded through traffic-related fines, surcharges for driving or 
boating under the influence, fees on temporary license tags, and a percentage of 
fees from the motorcycle specialty tag. Id.  
 100. See Rodriguez, 5 So.3d at 25 (finding BSCI funding within the 
definition of state or local public benefit, and not within any of the statutory 
exemptions).  
 101. See City of New York v. Stone, 782 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2004) (finding disbursement of food stamps to illegal immigrants a violation of 
Section 411).  
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In contrast, the California Court of Appeals reasoned in 
County of Alameda v. Agustin102 that the state’s order requiring 
child support payments and the state’s provision of child support 
collection services to an illegal immigrant are not “state or local 
public benefit[s].”103 Child support payments and child support 
collection services, the court reasoned, are not similar to any of 
the benefits listed in Section 411(c)(1)(B).104 The court found this 
dissimilarity because the source of child support payments 
ordered by the state was ultimately private.105 More importantly, 
the court distinguished child support services provided by the 
state from the other benefits listed in Section 411(c)(1)(B):  
The benefits specifically listed in section 1621 . . . are all either 
direct income support payments or services intended to meet 
the daily needs of disadvantaged persons. Significantly, such 
payments and services are continuing, or potentially 
continuing benefits, intended to provide ongoing public 
support for the recipients as long as required. Child support 
collection services are quite different . . . these services are 
intended to help recipients support themselves . . . child 
support collection services return to the local agency 
considerably more funds than they cost.106 
The court in Rajeh v. Steel City Corporation107 similarly 
found workers’ compensation funds outside the definition of 
“state or local public benefit” because workers’ compensation 
“operates as a balance of mutual compromise between the 
interests of the employer and the employee,”108 in contrast to the 
listed benefits, which “are either means for the government to 
assist people with economic hardships until they are able to 
financially manage on their own . . . or are an earned benefit, 
                                                                                                     
 102. No. A115092, 2007 WL 2759474, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2007).  
 103. Id.  
 104. See id. (explaining that child support services and payments fall 
outside the definition of “state or local public benefit”).  
 105. See id. (“Child support payments clearly do not fall into this 
category . . . they are payments made by private individuals. The fact that the 
County might assist in their collection does not change the private source of the 
payments.”).  
 106. Id.  
 107. 813 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). 
 108. Id. at 707.  
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such as retirement.”109 Thus, these courts drew a distinction 
between benefits that are direct, need-based payments aimed at 
public support and benefits that aim to increase self-sufficiency 
through indirect state support. Like reduced tuition, both child 
support payments and services and workers’ compensation funds 
derive from an amalgam of sources, not directly from the state. 
3. Denying Reduced Tuition Under Section 411 Is Inconsistent 
with Congressional Intent 
Construing Section 411 as an impediment to reduced tuition 
is also inconsistent with congressional intent in enacting 
PRWORA. Congress codified its purpose: to further national 
immigration policy emphasizing self-sufficiency, such that “aliens 
within the Nation’s borders not depend on public resources to 
meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and 
resources.”110 Access to higher education through reduced tuition, 
a situation in which the student is contributing financial 
resources and receiving no direct payment from the state, is an 
important means to this self-sufficiency. As the Supreme Court 
has long noted, “education prepares individuals to be self-reliant 
and self-sufficient participants in society.”111 Education is 
“providing the basic tools by which individuals might lead 
economically productive lives,”112 thereby promoting reliance on 
individual capability rather than public resources. Limiting 
access to education in this way, then, violates Congress’s intent to 
promote self-sufficiency because it confines what the law views as 
fundamental to accomplish both self-reliance and productive 
participation in society. 
                                                                                                     
 109. Id.  
 110. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1)–(2) (2012).  
 111. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).  
 112. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).  
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4. Denying Reduced Tuition Under Section 411 Is Inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s View of Public Education 
The Court has uniquely valued public education and 
explicitly distinguished it from other types of social welfare, 
particularly in two bellwether cases. In Plyler v. Doe,113 the 
Supreme Court recognized the value of providing fundamental 
education, even to children in the United States illegally.114 
Considering both a Texas statute withholding funds from local 
public districts for the primary and secondary education of 
children not legally admitted into the United States and a 
particular school district’s attempt to charge such students 
tuition, Plyler underscored the consequences of denying a public 
education to undocumented students.115 
First, the Court recognized lax enforcement of immigration 
laws produced a substantial population of illegal immigrants, 
which “raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented 
resident aliens, encouraged by some reason to remain here as a 
source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that 
our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents.”116 
This possibility, the Court reasoned, “presents most difficult 
problems for a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles 
of equality under law.”117 In addition, the Court noted, though all 
persons in the country unlawfully are subject to deportation, 
“there is no assurance that a child subject to deportation will ever 
be deported. An illegal entrant might be granted federal 
permission to continue to reside in this country, or even to 
                                                                                                     
 113. See id. In Plyler, the Court examined the claim that the Texas statute 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 202. The Court determined that the 
Equal Protection Clause extends even to those in the United States illegally. Id. 
at 210–12. The Court concluded Texas did not demonstrate any legitimate state 
interest served by instituting this statute, and the law, therefore, violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 224–30. 
 114. See id. at 230 (“It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved 
by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of 
the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.”).  
 115. See id. at 202 (describing the Texas statute under consideration).  
 116. Id. at 218–19.  
 117. Id. at 219.  
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become a citizen.”118 Because deportation is discretionary with 
the federal government, a state cannot determine with certainty 
that an undocumented child will absolutely be deported, and “[i]t 
would of course be most difficult for the State to justify a denial of 
education to a child enjoying an inchoate federal permission to 
remain.”119 It is Congress, the Court noted, that possesses 
plenary authority over immigration; the state may only act when 
its action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate 
state goal, and even the judiciary greatly defers to Congress.120 
Second, the Court also noted that because of the critically 
important nature of public education, putting this entire class of 
individuals under the enduring disability of unequal education 
violates well-settled principles governing the nature of education:  
Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the 
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education.121 
It is this importance, the Court reasoned, that indicates 
education is not “merely some governmental ‘benefit’ 
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare 
legislation.”122 Rather, it is of “supreme importance,”123 and 
critical to society, because “[w]e cannot ignore the significant 
social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied 
the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social 
order rests.”124 The enduring disability imposed on this particular 
class by denial of education to children brought illegally into the 
country by their parents is unwarranted, according to the Court: 
“the children who are plaintiffs . . . can affect neither their 
                                                                                                     
 118. Id. at 226.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 226 (quoting DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 351 (1976)), 
superseded by statute, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).  
 121. Id. at 223 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).  
 122. Id. at 221.  
 123. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1920).  
 124. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).  
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parents’ conduct nor their own status.”125 Though undocumented 
status is the product of concededly unlawful action and therefore 
not an absolutely immutable characteristic, burdening these 
children with the conduct of adults “does not comport with 
fundamental conceptions of justice.”126 Given this, the Court 
found that “[i]t is difficult to understand precisely what the State 
hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a 
subclass of illiterates within our boundaries.”127 
Because of the unique status of education and the 
entrustment of immigration power to the federal government, the 
Court found no sufficient justification to withhold education 
without clear indication from Congress that national immigration 
policy intends it:  
We are reluctant to impute to Congress the intention to 
withhold from those children, for so long as they are present in 
this country . . . access to a basic education. In other contexts, 
undocumented status, coupled with some articulable federal 
policy, might enhance state authority with respect to the 
treatment of undocumented aliens. But in the area of special 
constitutional sensitivity presented by these cases, and in the 
absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the 
present legislative record, we perceive no national policy that 
supports the State in denying these children an elementary 
education.128 
Thus, Plyler prevented the state from eroding congressional 
immigration policy by limiting access to education without clear 
congressional approval because education is, by its nature, 
fundamentally distinct from other social benefits.  
Though Plyler speaks of primary and secondary education, 
the Court, in Grutter v. Bollinger,129 recognized the value of 
                                                                                                     
 125. Id. at 220.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 230. 
 128. Id. at 226.  
 129. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331–32 (2003) (“We have 
repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students for 
work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to ‘sustaining our political 
and cultural heritage’ . . . . For this reason, the diffusion of knowledge and 
opportunity through public institutions of higher education must be accessible 
to all individuals.” (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221)). 
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educational access existing more keenly in public higher 
education. Grutter noted that “the diffusion of knowledge and 
opportunity through public institutions of higher education must 
be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.”130 
Further, “[e]nsuring that public institutions are open and 
available to all segments of American society . . . represents a 
paramount government objective,” and “nowhere is the 
importance of such openness more acute than in the context of 
higher education.”131 The Court concluded that “[a]ll members of 
our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness 
and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this 
training.”132 Grutter thus repeats the quintessence of Plyler by 
underlining the essential social value of access and openness in 
postsecondary education. 
Ambiguity consumes Section 411, and presumptively 
aligning reduced tuition with the social welfare benefits listed in 
Section 411 thus strays from the clear line drawn by the Court to 
divide such access to education from social welfare benefits.133 
Interpreting this uncertainty to functionally deny public 
education collaterally undercuts Plyler and Grutter by 
disregarding the search for clear congressional intent before 
imposing such a disability. As noted in Plyler, there is no 
guarantee of deportation until it occurs, and the state has no 
justifiable interest in creating an undereducated subclass by 
denying an essential postsecondary education. Including reduced 
tuition as a prohibited benefit under Section 411, then, hastily 
distorts the language of the statute, discounts congressional 
intent, and neglects the Supreme Court’s high regard for 
openness in public education. 
                                                                                                     
 130. Id. at 331.  
 131. Id. at 331–32 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).  
 132. Id. at 332.  
 133. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the uncertainty in Section 411). 
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IV. Federal Courts Will Not Hear a Section 411 Claim  
There is no indication that any federal agency has taken 
enforcement action under either Section 505 or Section 411.134 As 
such, private lawsuits remain an appealing avenue for 
enforcement proceedings,135 but nonjusticiability in federal court 
further complicates the interpretive hitch to Section 411: federal 
courts will likely never hear a claim from a private plaintiff under 
Section 411. First, the statute itself carries no private right of 
action.136 Second, a private plaintiff is limited both by a state 
university’s immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment 
and by the lack of a particularized injury to support standing.137 
Finally, constitutional claims to tuition classifications are only 
successful in limited circumstances, none of which are present 
here.138 
                                                                                                     
 134. See Brief in Opposition at 27, Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
No. 10-1029 (Cal. Apr. 18, 2011) (noting that no agency has enforced these 
provisions). In addition, the Washington Legal Foundation filed formal 
complaints with DHS in 2005 requesting enforcement action under Section 505; 
to date, no action has been taken. See Case Detail: In re In-State Tuition for 
Illegal Aliens, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., http://www.wlf.org/litigating/case_detail. 
asp?id=366 (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (noting the lack of DHS action) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 135. See, e.g., Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1127 (10th Cir. 2007) (dismissing 
plaintiff’s federal law challenge to a state’s in-state tuition law for a lack of 
standing and lack of private right of action); Anthony Cotton, Tom Tancredo 
Group Plans Suit Over Immigrant Tuition at Metro, DENVER POST (June 27, 
2012), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_20945697/tom-tancredo-
group-plans-suit-over-immigrant-tuition (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (discussing 
an imminent lawsuit in Colorado) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). To date, no federal court has heard a challenge on the merits to a 
policy granting in-state tuition to undocumented students.  
 136. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the lack of a private right of action 
under Section 411). 
 137. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the sovereign immunity limitations to a 
Section 411 suit).  
 138. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the likely failure of constitutional 
challenges to tuition classifications).  
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A. Statutory Enforcement of Personal Rights  
1. Implied Private Rights of Action and § 1983 Claims 
A plaintiff may attempt to enforce the statutory right under 
the statute itself or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides 
redress for deprivation of rights under color of law,139 but neither 
provides real answer to an aggrieved plaintiff. The “fact that a 
federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does 
not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of 
that person.”140 For a private plaintiff to sue under the provisions 
of Section 411, then, there must be an implied private right of 
action in its provisions. A § 1983 analysis differs in that, although 
the statute must still carry a private right of action, it need not 
carry a private remedy because § 1983 itself carries one, which 
Congress has explicitly authorized in the statutory text.141 
Determining whether a private right exists at all, however, does 
not differ in its analysis in actions seeking relief through an 
implied private right of action or under § 1983.142 In other words, 
if there is no clear evidence Congress intends to create new 
individual rights under a statute, “there is no basis for a private 
suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied private right of 
action.”143 If there is clear evidence Congress intended to create a 
private right under a federal statute, that right is presumptively 
                                                                                                     
 139. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
 140. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 668 (1979).  
 141. See Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284–85 (2002) (describing the 
difference between a § 1983 analysis and an implied private right of action 
analysis).  
 142. See id. (“A court’s role in discerning whether personal rights exist in 
the § 1983 context should therefore not differ from its role in discerning whether 
personal rights exist in the implied right of action context.” (citation omitted)).  
 143. Id. at 286.  
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enforceable under § 1983, but it may not be enforceable under the 
terms of the statute without indication of a remedy.144  
In determining whether there is an implied private right of 
action, the Supreme Court focuses on congressional intent.145 As 
such, the finding of a private right of action depends primarily on 
the construction of the statute itself.146 Importantly, the statute 
must demonstrate congressional intent in explicit rights-creating 
terms.147 The text must be “phrased in terms of the person 
benefited,”148 with an “unmistakable focus on the benefited 
class.”149 In addition, even if the statute has such rights-creating 
terms, the plaintiff still must show intent to “create not just a 
private right, but also a private remedy.”150 Consequently, 
because of separation of powers concerns and judicial hesitancy to 
make law without clear congressional authorization, courts rarely 
find implied private rights of action.151 
                                                                                                     
 144. See id. (discussing the requirements of an implied private right of 
action and § 1983 claims).  
 145. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) (noting 
congressional intent is the most important factor in a private right of action 
analysis). The Court’s analysis formerly focused on a four-part test: 
(1) legislative intent; (2) the consistency of the remedy with the underlying 
purposes of the legislative scheme; (3) whether the plaintiff was a member of the 
class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; and (4) whether the cause of 
action is one traditionally relegated to state law. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 66 
(1975) (outlining the test for implied private right of action cases), overruling 
recognized by Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“It could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash 
analysis in [Touche Ross].”). The Court now focuses on congressional intent, 
treating the other factors as indicia of that intent. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 
575  
[T]he Court did not decide that each of these factors is entitled to 
equal weight. The central inquiry remains whether Congress 
intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause 
of action . . . the first three factors . . . are ones traditionally relied 
upon in determining legislative intent.  
 146. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568 (“The question of the existence of a 
statutory cause of action is, of course, one of statutory construction.”).  
 147. See Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283–84 (2002) (requiring the statute 
contain language showing enforceable rights). 
 148. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 668, 692 n.13 (1979).  
 149. Id. at 691 (emphasis added).  
 150. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (emphases added).  
 151. See id. at 286 (“Without [statutory intent], a cause of action does not 
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2. Application to Other Cases Indicates No Implied Private Right 
of Action Under Section 411 
Because the analysis used when searching for a personal 
right is the same whether the court is looking for an implied 
private right of action in the statute itself or a private right of 
action under § 1983, precedent considering both private rights of 
action and § 1983 is relevant. Generally, these cases examine 
whether various statutes evince congressional intent to confer a 
private right of action. For example, in Cannon v. University of 
Chicago,152 the Supreme Court found that Title IX of the 1972 
Education Act Amendments to the Higher Education Act,153 in 
mirroring Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,154 carried an 
implied private right of action. In relevant part, Title IX reads: 
“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subject to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”155 Because Congress 
intended both statutes to prevent the use of federal funds to 
support discriminatory programs and to “provide individual 
citizens effective protection against [these] practices,”156 only a 
private right of action could accomplish the latter.157 Thus, the 
                                                                                                     
exist, and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a 
policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”); see also Lisa E. Key, 
Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983: The Supreme 
Court’s Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 283, 294–96 (1996) (discussing Supreme Court rulings on implied 
private rights of action); Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 to Enforce Title VI’s 
Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 353–57 (2001) (noting the 
Supreme Court rarely finds implied private rights of action).  
 152. 441 U.S. 677, 668 (1979). 
 153. Higher Education Act of 1965, tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 
amended by Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2012)). Much of Cannon’s 
reasoning stems from Title IX’s similarity to Title VI, for which many lower 
courts had already found a private right of action and remedy. See Cannon, 441 
U.S. at 694–98 (discussing the history of Title IX’s similarities to Title VI).  
 154. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).  
 155. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 156. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704. 
 157. See id. at 706 (discussing the legislature’s purpose in enacting Title IX).  
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Court found sufficient congressional intent to find a private cause 
of action. The Court noted158 several examples of statutory rights-
creating language that implicate a private cause of action—“no 
person shall be denied the right to vote”;159 “[e]mployees shall 
have the right to organize and bargain collectively through 
representatives”;160 “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have 
the same right.”161 In each example, a right is conferred directly 
on a class of persons, demonstrating sufficient congressional 
intent. 
Gonzaga v. Doe162 demonstrates nonrights-creating language. 
In Gonzaga, the Supreme Court concluded the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)163 lacked personal 
rights-conveying language in its nondisclosure of educational 
records provisions.164 The statute under consideration reads “[n]o 
funds shall be made available under any applicable program to 
any educational agency or institution which has a policy or 
practice of permitting the release of education records . . . of 
students without the written consent of their parents to any 
individual, agency, or organization.”165 Gonzaga reasoned that 
FERPA did not convey personal rights either under the statute 
itself or § 1983 because it had no rights-creating language, 
addressed itself to the Secretary of Education rather than 
individuals on whom it purportedly conferred enforceable rights, 
and employed a focus on institutional policy and practice, rather 
than on individual instances of disclosure.166 Gonzaga 
distinguished the rights-creating text of Title IX from the 
nonrights-creating text of FERPA because Title IX used 
                                                                                                     
 158. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979) 
(discussing examples of rights-creating language).  
 159. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969). 
 160. Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 
213 (1944). 
 161. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969). 
 162. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).  
 163. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2012).  
 164. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 276 (discussing the FERPA claims at issue).  
 165. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(b)(1).  
 166. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287–89 (finding no personal right under 
FERPA).  
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“individually focused terminology” such as “[n]o person shall,” 
while FERPA speaks only to the Secretary of Education, 
“directing that ‘[n]o funds shall be made available.’”167 This focus 
is “two steps removed” from the interests of individual 
students.168  
Similarly, in Day v. Bond,169 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit found no private right of action under Section 505 
of IIRIRA.170 The Tenth Circuit found the text lacked rights-
creating language showing congressional intent, reasoning that 
the provision imposed a “limit on the authority of postsecondary 
educational institutions” rather than affording a benefit to an 
individual.171 Further, the provision “addresses itself to the 
institutions affected and their authority to provide benefits to 
illegal aliens, not to the class of nonresident citizens who 
incidentally benefit from its provisions.”172 “The focus is [a step] 
removed from the interests of individual students and parents 
and clearly does not confer the sort of ‘individual entitlement’ 
that is enforceable under § 1983” or an implied private right of 
action.173 Like FERPA in Gonzaga, the Tenth Circuit reasoned, 
the provision here speaks to institutional policy and practice and 
employs an aggregate focus that cannot “give rise to individual 
rights.”174 
                                                                                                     
 167. Id. at 287.  
 168. Id. 
 169. 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007).  
 170. 8 U.S.C. § 1623 (2012); see also supra Part III.A (examining Section 505 
of IIRIRA). Section 505 reads: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an alien who is not 
lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis 
of residence within a State . . . for any postsecondary education 
benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible for 
such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope) without 
regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1623. 
 171. See Day, 500 F.3d at 1139 (finding that the statute lacked requisite 
congressional intent).  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. (citations omitted).  
 174. Id. (citations omitted).  
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Day further noted, but did not decide, that other provisions 
in the immigration code may be similarly limited.175 In 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(a)(1), the statute provides that “[t]he Secretary of 
Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and 
enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the 
immigration and naturalization of aliens.”176 The Tenth Circuit 
viewed this provision, combined with the lack of rights-creating 
language in Section 505 itself, as further evidence that Congress 
contemplated federal, not private, enforcement.177 
3. The Text of Section 411 Indicates No Private Right of Action 
Like IIRIRA Section 505, PRWORA Section 411 frames its 
prohibition by limiting the authority of institutions to provide 
specified benefits to illegal aliens.178 Section 411 provides that an 
unqualified alien “is not eligible for any State or local public 
benefit.”179 In addressing itself to institutions rather than 
individual citizens who may incidentally benefit from the 
prohibitions, Section 411 lacks the rights-creating language and 
individually focused terminology that suggest congressional 
intent to impose a private right of action. As in Gonzaga, 
Section 411 speaks to institutional policy and practice, directing 
that institutions not make benefits available to unqualified 
aliens.180 The provision confers no specific right directly on a class 
of persons. Further, as in Day, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) suggests 
administration and enforcement of the provision lies with DHS, 
not with private citizens.181 Combined with the lack of rights-
                                                                                                     
 175. See id. (“We do not conclude that private rights are not conferred under 
other provisions of the immigration code.”).  
 176. Id.  
 177. See id. (discussing § 1103(a)(1) in combination with § 1623).  
 178. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012) (providing that an unqualified alien “is 
not eligible for any State or local public benefit”), with id. § 1623 (“[A]n alien 
who is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis 
of residence within a State . . . for any postsecondary education benefit.”).  
 179. Id. § 1621. 
 180. See supra notes 162–68 and accompanying text (discussing Gonzaga).  
 181. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).  
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creating language in Section 411 itself, it seems Congress did not 
intend private enforcement. 
B. Sovereign Immunity and Standing Limitations 
A private plaintiff suing a state university in federal court 
will also be limited by the state university’s sovereign immunity. 
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he judicial power of 
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of 
any foreign state.”182 The Supreme Court has held this bars 
private citizen suits against state governments in federal and 
state court without their consent.183 With some exceptions, state 
universities are considered arms of the state for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes.184  
In Ex Parte Young,185 the Court limited the sovereign 
immunity doctrine by allowing a state official to be sued in 
federal court for ongoing violation of federal law as long as the 
                                                                                                     
 182. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 183. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (finding that state 
governments maintain their sovereignty in both federal and state courts for 
claims arising under federal law). 
 184. See Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) to Bring an Affirmative-Action 
Challenge, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 85, 91–97 (2012) (noting state universities are 
generally arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes). The Supreme 
Court has never directly spoken on whether a state university is an arm of the 
state. See Kelly Knivila, Public Universities and the Eleventh Amendment, 78 
GEO. L.J. 1723, 1726 n.12 (1990) (describing the lack of Supreme Court 
precedent on this question). Whether a state university is an “arm of the state” 
for sovereign immunity purposes is often a question of state law and the 
financial independence afforded to the university; however, most courts still 
conclude that a state university is an arm of the state. See, e.g., Lewis v. Univ. of 
Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 665 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding 
the university was an arm of the state); Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 546–50 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding the University of Iowa 
immune as a state agency).  
 185. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Young, the Court concluded that a state official 
enforcing an unconstitutional legislative enactment is in conflict with the 
authority of the Constitution, and therefore “stripped of his official or 
representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of 
his individual conduct.” Id. at 159.  
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state is not the real party in interest.186 The state is considered 
the real party in interest, however, when the “action is in essence 
one for the recovery of money from the state,”187 in which case the 
state is entitled to invoke Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity even if the nominal defendants are state officials. 
Recently, the Court reiterated the force of Young by confirming 
courts need only determine whether “[the] complaint alleges an 
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly 
characterized as prospective.”188 An action permitted by Young, 
then, requires prospective relief; the state cannot be sued for 
retrospective damages without its consent.189 Though the Court 
recently found no bar to a state suing itself,190 sovereign 
immunity remains prohibitive for a private plaintiff suing an arm 
of the state. 
A private plaintiff, then, would be limited to prospective 
injunctive relief and prohibited from seeking retrospective 
damages, and it is unclear what injunctive relief a private 
plaintiff would have standing to pursue. Article III standing 
requires a plaintiff in federal court to show concrete and 
particularized injury-in-fact, a causal connection between the 
injury and the challenged conduct, and a likelihood that the 
                                                                                                     
 186. See id. (allowing a state official to be sued in federal court for ongoing 
violations of federal law); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 
89, 101 (1984) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials 
when the state is the real, substantial party in interest.” (citations omitted)).  
 187. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of State of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 
(1945); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (confirming the 
state is effectively the real party in interest if the suit is one for payment from 
the state treasury).  
 188. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) 
(citation omitted).  
 189. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 676 (“[A] federal court’s remedial power, 
consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective 
injunctive relief, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the 
payment of funds from the state treasury.” (citations omitted)).  
 190. Va. Office of Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 (2010). 
In Stewart, the Court permitted a suit by a state agency against another state 
agency, finding it no different than a private plaintiff suing the state agency. 
See id. (“[T]he limits we have recognized reflect the principle that ‘the general 
criterion for determining when a suit is in fact against the sovereign is the effect 
of the relief sought.’” (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 
U.S. 89, 107 (1984))).  
THE PROMISE OF PLYLER 2379 
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.191 An out-of-state 
resident suing to enforce Section 411 would have to show ongoing 
threat of future injury. First, no such plaintiff could show that 
any money spent on an undocumented student would go to him 
but for the violative policy—an out-of-state resident would never 
receive in-state tuition regardless of whether undocumented 
students receive in-state tuition. Further, a claim that future out-
of-state students shoulder any financial burden for the tuition 
reduction for undocumented students is, at best, a speculative 
showing when university operating revenue is a mix of funds 
generally employed for the benefit of all students.192 The Tenth 
Circuit similarly rejected out-of-state resident Equal Protection 
Clause challenges to an in-state tuition policy for lack of standing 
because the injuries were too speculative, could not be attributed 
to the university’s in-state tuition policy, and were not 
redressable by the court because these plaintiffs would never 
receive in-state tuition.193 
C. Constitutional Claims 
A constitutional challenge under Section 411 similarly lacks 
force. First, though the provision could implicate the Equal 
Protection Clause,194 the Supreme Court has rejected Equal 
Protection Clause challenges to residency-based tuition 
classifications provided the classification is uniformly applied and 
based on physical presence and intent to remain.195 The Court 
                                                                                                     
 191. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (noting 
that the irreducible constitutional minimum for standing is injury-in-fact, 
causation, and redressability). 
 192. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text (discussing the sources of 
university operating revenue); see also Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1132–35 
(10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claims for lack of standing). 
 193. See Day, 500 F.3d at 1132–35 (dismissing the case for lack of standing). 
 194. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”).  
 195. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 325–33 (1983) (permitting 
residency-based tuition classifications); see also supra note 28 and 
accompanying text (discussing challenges to tuition classifications). 
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placed certain limits on tuition classifications, including 
prohibiting an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence.196 The 
Court recognized the state’s legitimate interest in giving 
preferential treatment to bona fide residents.197 In other words, 
the tuition classification alone is not a constitutional violation. 
Further, as in Day, plaintiffs bringing constitutional claims 
would struggle to show a sufficiently particularized personal 
stake to demonstrate standing.198 Because every challenge to in-
state tuition rates for undocumented students is restricted by the 
aforementioned justiciability obstacles, there is no indication any 
federal court would ever reach any constitutional question. 
V. A Possible Challenge: State Attorney General Enforcement of 
Section 411 Under State Consumer Protection Law 
Because Section 411 carries no private right of action and 
faces sovereign immunity and standing issues, it is unlikely a 
private plaintiff could successfully maintain a lawsuit in federal 
court under Section 411. State courts, however, bear no 
comparable constraint. As such, enforcement of, for example, a 
state consumer protection law incorporating Section 411 as an 
ingredient presents a legitimate vehicle for attempted 
enforcement. The importance of consumer protection in education 
is on the rise. First, the surge of the for-profit education sector199 
                                                                                                     
 196. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (finding an irrebuttable 
presumption of nonresidence violative of the Due Process Clause). In Vlandis, 
the state of Connecticut established a student’s residency for tuition purposes 
conclusively and irreversibly at the time of admission. Id. at 443. The Court 
found that denying a student the opportunity to present evidence of residency 
because of a presumption of nonresidency violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.  
 197. See id. at 453 (recognizing a state has a legitimate interest in 
maintaining the quality of its public institutions and treating its residents 
preferentially). 
 198. See Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1132–35 (10th Cir. 2007) (dismissing 
claims from out-of-state residents under the Equal Protection Clause for lack of 
standing); supra Part IV.B (discussing lack of standing).  
 199. For-profit education generally refers to schools that operate for profit 
and typically offer programs with job-specific training, such as secretarial school 
or cosmetology school. See Patrick F. Linehan, Note, Dreams Protected: A New 
Approach to Policing Proprietary Schools’ Misrepresentations, 89 GEO. L.J. 753, 
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and the rapid increase in federal and state aid to such 
institutions200 in the past decade brought heightened attention to 
aggressive recruiting and marketing tactics.201 This attention 
brings stories of fraud, misrepresentation, and manipulation of 
consumers, which have not escaped the focus of federal and state 
leaders, and state attorneys general have initiated investigations 
into these tactics.202 For example, Kentucky Attorney General 
Jack Conway filed a state lawsuit in July 2011 alleging Daymar 
College, a for-profit college, deceived and misled students.203 
Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan filed a similar lawsuit 
against Westwood College in 2012, claiming the college 
misrepresented its criminal justice program.204  
Although the for-profit sector currently bears the burden of 
this attention, the spirit signals a shift toward increasing 
protection of consumers and their investment in higher education 
at a time when students are increasingly borrowing more money 
and increasingly defaulting on their loans.205 In this context, 
                                                                                                     
756 (2001) (describing the nature of proprietary schools); see also 34 C.F.R. 
§ 600.5 (2012) (defining “proprietary institution of higher education” for federal 
student aid purposes).  
 200. See THOMAS L. HARNISCH, AM. ASSOC. OF STATE COLLEGES AND UNIVS., 
CHANGING DYNAMICS IN STATE OVERSIGHT AT FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES 2 (2012), 
http://www.aascu.org/uploadedFiles/AASCU/Content/Root/PolicyAndAdvocacy/P
olicyPublications/Policy_Matters/Changing%20Dynamics%20in%20State%20Ov
ersight%20of%20For-Profit%20Colleges.pdf (describing the increase in for-profit 
education).  
 201. See Linehan, supra note 199, at 756–63 (describing the recruiting and 
marketing tactics of proprietary schools). 
 202. See id. at 763–74 (discussing misrepresentation and manipulation at 
proprietary schools). See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-
948T, FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES 
ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING 
PRACTICES (2010) (discussing examples of fraud uncovered in a GAO 
investigation into for-profit colleges).  
 203. See HARNISCH, supra note 200, at 4 (discussing the state attorney 
general investigation into Daymar College).  
 204. See id. (describing the state attorney general lawsuit against Westwood 
College).  
 205. See National Student Loan Two-Year Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/ 
defaultrates.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (listing national cohort default 
rates since 1987) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The 
Department of Education measures default rates as the percentage of borrowers 
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then, any college or university, including a state public 
university, could reasonably expect scrutiny for its treatment of 
consumers. 
A. Consumer Protection Law Generally 
Consumer protection law in the United States is a 
combination of federal and state law.206 The Federal Trade 
Commission enforces the primary federal consumer protection 
statute, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), which 
prohibits unfair or deceptive business practices that affect 
commerce.207 In addition, numerous federal laws regulate specific 
industries.208 Like their federal counterparts, state consumer 
protection laws prohibit unfair and deceptive trade practices.209 
Though they vary considerably from state to state, there are some 
consistent themes. First, each state’s general consumer protection 
act is typically some version of the Unfair and Deceptive Acts and 
Practices Statute (UDAP).210 Most prohibit false, unfair, or 
deceptive trade practices and confer enforcement power on the 
state attorney general.211 Substantively, many states simply 
include a general prohibition against deceptive and unfair 
conduct, though some states list specific prohibited conduct.212 
                                                                                                     
who enter repayment in a fiscal year and default by the end of the next fiscal 
year. Id. The most recently issued national default rate (for fiscal year 2010) 
was 9.1%—a steady increase from 5.9% in fiscal year 2000. Id.  
 206. See Edward M. Crane, Nicholas J. Eichenseer & Emma S. Glazer, U.S. 
Consumer Protection Law: A Federalist Patchwork, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 305, 306 
(2011) (discussing the nature of consumer protection law in the United States).  
 207. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).  
 208. See, e.g., Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (prohibiting any 
one institution from acting as any combination of investment bank, commercial 
bank, or insurance company); Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 301–399 (regulating the safety and marketing of food).  
 209. See Crane, supra note 206, at 326 (describing state consumer protection 
laws).  
 210. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., INC., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2 (2009) (discussing the UDAP statutes).  
 211. See Crane, supra note 206, at 327 (explaining commonalities among 
state consumer protection laws).  
 212. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., INC., supra note 210, at 11 (discussing 
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Most state statutes do not require proof the wrongdoer had 
fraudulent knowledge or intent.213 Most states do require a 
private plaintiff show he relied on the false representations 
associated with the deceptive practice.214 States often exercise 
these powers consistently with their federal counterparts.215 
Critically, unlike the federal consumer protection statutes, state 
UDAP statutes confer a private right of action; with some 
exception, they allow consumer lawsuits for actual damages, 
injunctive relief, and, in some states, punitive damages.216 
B. Relationship to Violations of Federal Law in Higher Education 
When a student enrolls in a state public university, that 
student is relying on the school’s representations. With most 
universities, that student is relying on, for example, the 
institution’s accreditation. An accrediting agency217 is a 
nongovernmental educational association that ensures the 
quality of education or training offered by the institutions or 
programs they accredit, as well as the financial and 
                                                                                                     
prohibited practices under UDAP statutes).  
 213. See Consumer Protection Handbook, 2004 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST LAW 
71 (discussing the scope of state consumer protection statutes).  
 214. See id. at 72 (explaining the reliance requirement).  
 215. See Crane, supra note 206, at 327 (“[T]he FTC and state enforcement 
officials often coordinate their efforts in the areas of consumer education, 
identity theft, telemarketing, and other national consumer protection issues.”).  
 216. See id. (expressing the conferral of a private right of action under 
UDAP statute).  
 217. Public universities are generally accredited at the institutional level by 
one of six regional accreditors: Middle States Commission on Higher Education, 
the New England Association of Schools and Colleges, the North Central 
Association of Colleges and Schools of the Higher Learning Commission, the 
Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities, the Southern Association 
of Colleges and Schools, or the Western Association of Schools and Colleges 
Accrediting Commission. See generally COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. 
ACCREDITATION (CHEA), RECOGNIZED ACCREDITING ORGANIZATIONS (AS OF 
SEPTEMBER 2012), http://www.chea.org/pdf/CHEA_USDE_AllAccred.pdf (listing 
the regional accrediting agencies). In addition, other accrediting agencies can be 
either institutional or programmatic, the latter authorizing only specific 
programs such as law or medicine. See CHEA, THE VALUE OF ACCREDITATION 2 
(2010), http://www.chea.org/pdf/Value%20of%20US%20Accreditation%2006.29.2 
010_buttons.pdf (describing the nature of accrediting agencies). 
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administrative integrity.218 To this end, accrediting agencies 
employ a complex set of standards and requirements for 
institutions seeking accreditation, and institutions seeking to 
maintain already-acquired accreditation.219 Title IV of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965,220 which makes available various federal 
loan and grant programs to students, requires an institution be 
accredited to participate.221 The U.S. Department of Education, 
which administers Title IV, does not itself accredit universities as 
a condition of Title IV eligibility; rather, the Secretary publishes 
a list of reliable accreditors and defers to those accreditors on 
questions of institutional quality to determine Title IV 
eligibility.222  
Accreditation, then, is valuable to both an institution and its 
students. First, it is an assurance of the quality of the education 
offered—a lack of accreditation often indicates a lack of quality. 
Accordingly, a student’s degree is more valuable from an 
accredited institution than an unaccredited institution. Second, it 
is the key to a major source of revenue for both institutions and 
students: federal student aid. Without accreditation, an 
institution and its students lose access to federal loans and 
grants.223 
Accreditation standards broadly require integrity, and often 
explicitly require compliance with federal and state law to attain 
                                                                                                     
 218. See 34 C.F.R. § 602.1 (2012) (explaining why the Secretary of Education 
approves accrediting agencies).  
 219. See generally MIDDLE STATES COMM’N ON HIGHER EDUC., 
CHARACTERISTICS OF EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: REQUIREMENTS OF 
AFFILIATION AND STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION (2006), http://www.msche.org/ 
publications/CHX-2011-WEB.pdf (detailing requirements for accreditation).  
 220. Higher Education Act of 1965, tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070–1099 (2012)).  
 221. See 34 C.F.R. § 600.4(a)(5)(i) (2012) (defining an institution of higher 
education as accredited). Accredited means “[t]he status of public recognition 
that a nationally recognized accrediting agency grants to an institution or 
educational program that meets the agency’s established requirements.” Id. 
§ 600.2.  
 222. See Accreditation in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (last 
updated Sept. 20, 2013), http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation. 
html#Overview (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the role of accrediting 
agencies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 223. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
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that integrity. For example, the Middle States Commission on 
Higher Education (Middle States) requires every institution 
“compl[y] with all applicable government (usually Federal and 
state) policies, regulations, and requirements.”224 The New 
England Association of Schools and Colleges requires institutions 
to “observe the spirit as well as the letter of applicable legal 
requirements.”225 The Higher Learning Commission of the North 
Central Association requires “the organization understand[] and 
abide[] by local, state, and federal laws and regulations applicable 
to it.”226 Integrity within the accreditation context, then, 
encompasses compliance with any and all applicable law. An 
egregious example of breach of this integrity by violating federal 
law arose in 2012, when Middle States warned Pennsylvania 
State University (Penn State) that its accreditation was in 
jeopardy for the university’s failure to comply with federal and 
state law in connection with the Jerry Sandusky scandal.227 
Because Section 411 lacks decisive interpretive guidance, a 
state public university granting in-state tuition to illegal 
immigrants risks violation of Section 411. If that university is 
found to violate Section 411, it is in violation of federal law, 
                                                                                                     
 224. MIDDLE STATES COMM’N ON HIGHER EDUC., supra note 219, at xii.  
 225. NEW ENGLAND ASS’N OF SCH. AND COLLS., STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION 
(2011), http://cihe.neasc.org/standards_policies/standards/standards_html_ver 
sion#standard_eleven (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 226. HIGHER LEARNING COMM’N OF THE N. CENTRAL ASS’N, COMMISSION 
POLICIES 16 (2012), available at http://www.ncahlc.org/Policy/commission-
policies.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 227. See Letter from R. Barbara Gitenstein, Chair, Middle States Comm’n 
on Higher Educ. Exec. Comm., to Dr. Rodney A. Erickson, President, The Pa. 
State Univ. (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.psu.edu/vpaa/pdfs/middle%20states/ 
middle_states_notification_8-6-12.pdf (notifying Penn State its accreditation 
was in jeopardy based on the university’s failure to comply with applicable 
government policies in the Jerry Sandusky scandal). The university’s 
accreditation was later reinstated following institutional self-studies and the 
implementation of new procedures. See Laura Nichols, Middle States Takes 
Penn State off ‘Warning List,’ Accreditation Intact, STATECOLLEGE.COM (Nov. 16, 
2012), http://www.statecollege.com/news/local-news/middle-states-takes-penn-
state-off-warning-list-accreditation-intact-1182146/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) 
(describing the removal of Penn State’s accreditation warning) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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breaching the integrity of the institution, and consequently 
risking its accreditation. A university risking its accreditation is 
risking the value of a degree from its institution—a degree from 
an unaccredited university is worth less than a degree from an 
accredited university. If a student enrolls believing a university is 
accredited and consciously maintaining its accreditation, a 
knowing violation of federal law that risks that accreditation 
would markedly betray the expectations of that student. In other 
words, representation that a university is an accredited 
institution inheres a representation of ongoing compliance with 
federal law; risking violation of Section 411 corrupts this 
representation. 
C. The State Attorney General as an Enforcement Mechanism 
With some variation, enforcement of a consumer protection 
statute can occur in two ways: (1) the state attorney general can 
institute an investigation and civil lawsuit against an offender, or 
(2) a private plaintiff can sue the offender for violating the 
consumer protection law. Attorneys general are uniquely situated 
law officers. First, in forty-three states, the attorney general is a 
popularly elected official.228 Though state constitutions and 
statutes define the responsibilities of attorneys general, state 
attorneys general may usually exercise their power and authority 
as the public interest requires.229 As such, state attorneys general 
often have the ability to defend or challenge state agency actions 
in court, even though the state agency is often the attorney 
general’s client.230 When state attorneys general decide to 
                                                                                                     
 228. See Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role 
of State Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 
2002 (2001) (discussing the election of the state attorneys general).  
 229. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 271 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (“The Attorney General has the power and it is his duty among the 
many devolving upon him by the common law to prosecute all actions necessary 
for the protection and defense of the property and the revenue of the state.” 
(quotations omitted)).  
 230. See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 57 (Emily Myers & Lynne Ross, eds., 2d ed. 2007) 
(describing the relationship of the state attorneys general to state agencies).  
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challenge agency action they find unlawful, however, they will 
often appoint special counsel to represent the agency.231 Because 
the state attorneys general are charged with enforcement and 
protection of the public good, they often have broader 
enforcement power than the available consumer remedies.232  
The state attorneys general are thus in the ideal position to 
force interpretation of this statute under state consumer 
protection law. First, given the increasing value placed on 
consumer protection in education,233 state attorneys general may 
take increasing notice of potential violations. Public universities 
are devised as operating in the public good, “promot[ing] the 
general welfare of the citizenry,”234 and “dedicated to the service 
of [the state] and its people.”235 Public universities, then, are 
uniquely situated in a position of public scrutiny; as such, their 
integrity is paramount. As the chief law enforcement officer in 
the state, the state attorney general aims to protect the integrity 
of public universities and the interests of state consumers 
through the enforcement of state consumer protection laws, even 
against another state agency in the same state. Potentially 
violating federal law and consequently risking accreditation poses 
a major hazard to the expectations of consumers—a degree from a 
school that represented itself as an accredited institution but 
ends up unaccredited is a much different investment than a 
degree from a school that complies with federal law and 
maintains its accreditation.  
                                                                                                     
 231. See id. at 58 (“In situations where the Attorney General believes the 
agency’s actions conflict with the public interest, the Attorney General may 
appoint special counsel for the agency and seek to protect the public interest 
through intervention in the suit or institution of separate proceedings against 
the agency.”).  
 232. See Consumer Protection Handbook, supra note 213, at 81–83 
(describing the enforcement capabilities of state attorneys general).  
 233. See supra Part V (discussing the increased role of consumer protection 
law in education).  
 234. Mission and Public Character, PA. ST. UNIV., http://www.psu.edu/this-
is-penn-state/leadership-and-mission/mission-and-character (last visited Nov. 
10, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 235. History & Mission, UNIV. OF N.C., http://www.northcarolina.edu/ 
about/mission.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
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Because federal nonjusticiability plagues Section 411, then, 
the statute is only justiciable as an element of a state law claim. 
In this regard, the state attorney general, charged with the 
enforcement of consumer protection statutes, could feasibly force 
a court to consider the statute to protect consumer investment in 
education by interpreting Section 411 at a time when student 
borrowing and debt is climbing. Because of the unique position of 
state attorneys general and the availability of a state forum, 
challenging Section 411 under state consumer protection law is a 
viable passage. 
VI. Conclusion 
Section 411 presents no bar to institutional policy providing 
in-state tuition to undocumented students. First, in-state tuition 
is not a benefit contemplated by the provision’s prohibition. 
Second, no private plaintiff can sue under the provision itself 
because it lacks a private right of action, is limited by the 
university’s sovereign immunity, and does not have a legitimate 
constitutional issue. The rights encompassed by Section 411 are 
only justiciable as an ingredient of a state law issue, which may 
be a viable claim under state consumer protection law.  
